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Abstract
We study efficient nonlinear taxation of labor and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian
model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially
over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital
income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.
1 Introduction
In most advanced countries, capital taxation is not only positive, but also progressive.1
This is inconsistent with existing economic models. On the one hand, most normative
theories prescribe zero capital income taxes. On the other hand, positive theories have
rationalized positive tax rates on capital income, but have remained silent regarding their
progressivity. The main purpose of this paper is to provide such a political economy
theory that addresses both the level and the progressivity of capital taxation.
Modern optimal-tax theory is founded on the trade-off between efficiency and redis-
tribution (Mirrlees (1971)). The losses in efficiency from taxation are determined mechan-
ically by the economic environment—preferences, technology and information. In con-
trast, the desire to redistribute, often modeled by a social welfare function, may implicitly
capture the outcome or demands of some political process.
However, if anything, actual policy making not only considers this trade-off, but also
constantly reconsiders it: policies chosen at some point, can be reformed or replaced by
1We provide some evidence towards the end of this intoduction, when we discuss how our results
compare to actual policies.
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new ones at any later time. Due to this lack of commitment, the credibility of policies
must be judged by projecting their effects into the future. The impact on future wealth in-
equality is of particular concern. Otherwise, large levels of inequality may create, ex post,
a political demand for reform, towards policies that redistribute wealth. The purpose of
this paper is to explore this idea and study optimal policy design when the credibility of
policies are taken into account.
Our theory blends recent developments in optimal taxation with elements of political
economy. We study a dynamic Mirrleesian model where policy is determined sequen-
tially. We allow for the most general non-linear tax schedules for labor and capital in-
come. Our main result shows that progressive capital taxation emerges naturally in this
setting.
Our deterministic economy abstracts from aggregate or idiosyncratic uncertainty. It
is populated by a continuum of agents that live for two periods and are heterogeneous
in their labor productivity, which is privately observed. The latter assumption precludes
the first-best outcome of full insurance. We assume that tax instruments are restricted
only by this asymmetry of information and political economy considerations. Absent
the latter, any incentive compatible allocation is implementable. In particular, we allow
for nonlinear taxation of labor and capital income. We study two models, the first with a
two-period horizon and the second with overlapping generations and an infinite horizon.
An important benchmark is the case with full commitment. If tax policy could be
chosen once and for all then standard results from the optimal taxation literature apply
in our economy. In particular, the seminal result by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) implies
that the optimal tax on capital is zero. Only a nonlinear tax on labor income is required.
However, without commitment, tax policy is not set in stone at the beginning of time.
In our model, it is determined sequentially over time by governments with utilitarian
welfare functions that decide taxes and transfers for the current period. The utilitarian
welfare function captures a concern for inequality and a desire to redistribute. This im-
plies that, without commitment, at any point in time, the most tempting deviation is to
wipe the slate clean and implement the most extreme redistribution. In particular, this
involves an expropriating capital levy.
In equilibrium, this extreme outcome can be prevented if there is a cost of deviating
and if no government finds the benefits of a deviation more tempting than incurring this
cost. In this paper we focus on two kinds of costs: direct costs and reputational costs. Ex
post, these costs may hold back governments. Central to our paper is the notion that, ex
ante, policies should be designed with an eye towards their credibility, and that inequality
may be a crucial determinant of the latter. We believe both features are important in
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modern democratic societies.
In our two-period model we introduce a direct cost of reforming tax policy. This cre-
ates an intermediate form of commitment. In our infinite horizon model with overlapping
generations, we assume there are no direct costs of reforming tax policy. Instead, we fo-
cus on the concerns for the loss of reputation. Reputation there works as follows. Upon
observing a deviation, the private sector’s expectations may shift, anticipating future gov-
ernments to behave similarly. This may lead to a bad economic outcome, in which agents
do not produce to avoid expropriation.
This is formalized using a dynamic game. Equilibrium outcomes must satisfy cred-
ibility constraints that ensure that no government prefers to deviate towards full redis-
tribution. The best outcome can then be determined as the solution to a social planning
problem incorporating these credibility constraints.2
As a consequence of these credibility constraints, policies deviate from the normative
benchmarks provided by the optimal tax literature. Our main result is that capital tax-
ation is progressive in the sense that agents that enjoy higher consumption face higher
marginal tax rates on their savings. We show that this feature can be implemented with a
tax schedule on wealth that is convex. As for the level, marginal tax rates may be positive
over some regions and negative over others. Indeed, in the two period version of the
model, the marginal tax rate on capital is always positive at the very top and negative at
the very bottom.
The intuition for these results is as follows. The sign and level of the marginal tax rate
placed on any agent is determined by the net effect that an extra unit of capital held by
this agent has on the credibility constraint. On the one hand, an extra unit of capital in the
hands of some particular agent increases the equilibrium value of the utilitarian objective.
In fact, it does so according to this agent’s marginal utility. On the other hand, more
capital also raises the value of a deviating policy towards full redistribution. The sign of
the optimal marginal tax depends on the net of these two effects, since this determines
whether it is preferable to encourage or discourage savings by any particular agent. For
instance, for a very rich agent, with high consumption and low marginal utility, an extra
unit of saving has a negligible effect on the equilibrium utilitarian value. However, the
extra unit of capital improves non-trivially the value attached to the deviation towards
full redistribution. Thus, capital may be positively taxed for rich agents. The reverse may
be true for poor enough agents with low consumption and high marginal utility. Capital
2In the infinite horizon model, the reputational mechanism discussed above corresponds to a trigger-
strategy equilibrium, where a deviation is followed by a bad continuation equilibrium. We draw on Chari
and Kehoe (1990) and focus on sustainable plans or policies, a refinement that focuses on symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibria.
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may be subsidized for these agents.
The same principle explains the progressivity of the marginal tax rate. The value that
an extra unit of capital has on the deviation path with full redistribution is independent of
who does the extra saving. The difference between this common value of one unit of capi-
tal under a deviation, and the value obtained in equilibrium from this extra capital, which
equals that agent’s marginal utility, is then solely a function of that agent’s consumption.
Thus, agents with higher consumption face a higher marginal tax on capital.
The progressivity in the taxation of capital reflects an important feature of the allo-
cation, that individual consumption is mean reverting. Agents with higher consumption
have lower average consumption growth. This requires that they face lower after-tax rates
of return, explaining the progressivity in marginal taxes on capital. It is optimal to have
mean reversion in consumption because this makes policies more credible. Progressive
taxation of capital emerges to reduce wealth inequality by discouraging accumulation
amongst the rich and encouraging it amongst the poor.
It is interesting to compare our results with actual policies. It is difficult to come up
with precise estimates of the level and progressivity of capital taxes (more so than for
income taxes). But progressivity of marginal tax rates is, broadly speaking, a feature of
actual capital tax policy in developed economies. Factors that contribute to positive cap-
ital taxes are corporate taxes, income taxes (where income includes not only labor but
also capital income, with usually some special treatment for capital gains), wealth taxes
(in some countries), and estate taxes. In most countries income taxes, estate taxes, and
wealth taxes when they exist, are progressive. Moreover, many tax exempted instru-
ments to promote retirement savings suchs as IRA’s and 401(k)’s have maximum annual
contribution levels. The result is that at least to some extent, capital taxes are progressive.
Our theory provides the first theoretical justification, to the best of our knowledge, for
this common feature of policy. However, some differences remain between our theoretical
results and actual policy. First, our theory predicts that capital taxes should be negative
for some households (at the bottom of the distribution). While this feature seems at odds
with actual policy, the comparison is more nuanced. Consider for example the case of
educational subsidies, which can be thought as negative marginal tax rates on human
capital accumulation. Second, our theory does not predict that marginal tax rates on labor
and capital should be related in a simple manner. This is in contrast with some features
of actual policy. For example, in reality, income taxation constitutes a joint taxation of
income and capital.
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Related literature. In this paper we build on our previous research by Farhi and Wern-
ing (2007, 2008) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2006, 2008a,b).
Within an intergenerational setting, Farhi and Werning (2007) studies an endowment
economy where altruistic agents face privately observed taste shocks. In this setting,
when the welfare of the first generation is maximized, the allocation features immisera-
tion so that there is no non-degenerate invariant distribution, as in Atkeson and Lucas
(1992). Following Phelan (2006) the paper considers other efficient allocations and traces
out the Pareto frontier between current and future generations by adding the constraint
that the expected welfare of all future generations remain above some exogenous level. A
key result is that these efficient allocations feature mean reversion, and as a consequence,
immiseration is overturned. Farhi and Werning (2008) studies a Mirrleesian model with
capital and focus on implications for taxation, especially estate taxation. The main result
is that the optimal marginal estate tax is progressive and negative. That is, intergener-
ational transfers should be subsidized, but the marginal subsidy should be smaller for
larger estates.
The current paper’s setup and results build on these two papers, but with important
differences. In the present model, policies are decided by successive governments, with-
out commitment. In any given period, the current government’s objective function is
utiliarian over the agents currently alive. Credible policies must keep future utilitarian
welfare for all successive governments above some level. Unlike the previous normative
models mentioned above, this level is now endogenous. It corresponds to the value at-
tached to deviating towards full redistribution, given that this then involves a direct cost
(as in our two period model) or an indirect cost by triggering a bad continuation equilib-
rium (as in our infinite horizon model with overlapping generations). We characterize the
equilibrium outcomes that maximize weighted utilitarian welfare criteria over the differ-
ent generations of agents. In terms of results, our implementation using nonlinear capital
taxation is similar to the one for estate taxation in Farhi and Werning (2008). Indeed,
the tax schedule shares the progressivity feature in both cases. However, an important
difference is that, whereas estate taxes were always negative, here we find that positive
marginal taxes may be optimal.
Sleet and Yeltekin (2006) consider the implications of a lack of societal credibility in
an Atkeson-Lucas economy without capital. In such settings, they show that the optimal
allocation from the perspective of the initial generation solves the problem of a commit-
ted planner who attaches positive weight to later generations. In later work, Sleet and
Yeltekin (2008a) integrate this analysis with an explicit model of voting over future allo-
cations. The current paper significantly extends these results. First, the earlier papers of
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Sleet and Yeltekin focus on allocations, not implementations. They do not derive impli-
cations for taxes. Second, these earlier papers do not include physical capital and assume
a different demographic structure from that adopted here. The introduction of capital
and the assumption of overlapping generations modifies and complicates the connection
between credibility and the societal weighting of generations. The overlapping genera-
tions framework explicitly separates personal intertemporal from social intergenerational
discounting. Binding credibility constraints in the future create a motive for suppressing
inequality amongst the old, but have ambiguous implications for capital accumulation.
In contrast, increases in a committed planner’s generational discount factor raise capital
accumulation, but may need not lead to a reduction in inequality amongst the old.
We also make contact with a literature on political economy incorporating limited
commitment and heterogenous agents. Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) study the link be-
tween wealth and investment in a dynamic game where output in every period is split
between consumption by two social groups and investment. They focus on the best sub-
game perfect equilirbium. The most profitable deviations involve one group extracting as
much consumption as possible, leaving no resources for investment. They show in exam-
ples that this might lead to lower capital accumulation in equilibrium than in the first best.
Whether these effects are more pronounced at low or high wealth levels depends on the
curvature of the utility and production functions, resulting respectively in growth traps
or situations with low growth at high wealth levels. Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Acemoglu
et al. (2007) study a model in which policy is set by a self-interested ruler or dictator who
derives utility from private consumption. They focus on the best equilibrium of the game
without commitment. The ruler’s preferred deviation expropriates all the economy’s re-
sources for its own private consumption; thus, higher capital increases the attractiveness
of this deviation. As a result, the best equilibrium discourages accumulation, implying a
positive marginal tax on capital. In contrast to our main result regarding progressivity, in
their setting all agents face the same positive tax rate. In addition, unless the ruler is impa-
tient, these distortions disappear in the long run because promised consumption transfers
to the ruler are backloaded in a way that makes the credibility constraint eventually not
bind.3 Bisin and Rampini (2006) study optimal policy in an economy with unobservable
endowments, when the planner has limited commitment. In their model, in contrast to
ours, reforms are not associated with any cost. As a result, full redistribution always oc-
3 Acemoglu et al. (2007) considers an extension where the ruler’s objective is a weighted average of
utilitarian welfare and the utility from its private consumption. This model is closer to ours, although they
do not consider the ruler’s weight on private consumption to be zero. We conjecture that our main result
on progressive capital taxation may obtain for this extension. However, this is not addressed because they
only study the aggregate distortions to capital accumulation, not individual ones.
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curs in the second period. They show that in this context, it is welfare improving to give
agents access to anonymous markets that the government cannot monitor.
The normative literature on capital taxation provides an important benchmark for our
results. Many normative optimal taxation models prescribe zero capital taxation. On the
one hand, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that in Ramsey models, capital
taxes should not be used in steady-state to finance government expenditures. On the
other hand, in a Mirrlees context, the uniform-taxation result by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) shows that optimal capital taxes are zero when is no uncertainty and preferences
are separable. A few theoretical papers analyze non-linear capital taxes under commit-
ment. Saez (2002) considers a model where the only source of heterogeneity is initial
wealth. In this setting, an initial capital levy that fully redistributes capital is optimal.
Saez assumes an exogenous upper bound on the marginal tax rate and characterizes the
optimal sequence of piecewise linear capital tax schedules. Benabou (2002) constructs
a model with human capital, instead of physical capital, and studies nonlinear taxation
of income, within a one-dimensional parametric class. As mentioned above, Farhi and
Werning (2008), study the related issue of nonlinear estate taxation.
Two branches of the political economy literature have touched upon the issue of capi-
tal taxation. Both strands of literature have rationalized positive tax rates on capital, but
have largely ignored the nonlinear taxation of capital.
The first branch revolves around the idea of time inconsistency first introduced by
Kydland and Prescott (1977). The typical setup is a Ramsey model with a representative
agent and a government which finances a public good using linear taxes. The central idea
is that once sunk, capital is inelastic, so that capital taxation is equivalent ex-post to lump
sum taxation. See Fischer (1980) and Klein and Rios-Rull (2003); Klein et al. (2008) for a
more recent treatment. Several papers analyze how reputation mechanisms can alleviate
the time inconsistency problem and result in intermediate levels of capital taxation. See
for example Kotlikoff et al. (1988), Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Phelan and Stacchetti
(2001).
The second branch is closest to our paper. It studies the linkage between income dis-
tribution, redistribution and growth, but mostly abstracts from time inconsistency prob-
lems.4 The typical setup features heterogenous agents and linear taxation combined with
lump sum rebates. If the median voter is less productive than the mean voter (Persson
and Tabellini (1994a)), or if the median voter derives a lesser fraction of its total income
4One notable exception is Persson and Tabellini (1994b), who reintroduce a time inconsistency problem
in an otherwise similar model. They emphasize strategic delegation, whereby voters might elect a govern-
ment that has a disproportionate stake in capital income.
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from capital than the mean voter (Alesina and Rodrick (1994); Bertola (1993)), strictly pos-
itive and higher than optimal capital tax rates will be chosen in the political equilibrium.
Our model combines elements of both literatures. Time inconsistency arises in our
setup because of the interaction between dynamic incentive provision and redistribution.
Incentives require inequality in consumption and savings. However, because of a concern
for equality, it is tempting to expropriate capital holdings and fully redistribute. The main
result of the paper that capital taxes are progressive is a new insight.
2 A Two Period Economy
We begin with a simple two period version of the model that helps bring out the essential
mechanism underlying our results. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents
of measure one that live in periods t = 0, 1. Agents work only in the period t = 0 and
consume in both periods t = 0, 1.
A worker with productivity θ0 that exerts work effort e0 delivers n0 = e0 · θ0 effective
units of labor. Productivity shocks are i.i.d. draws from a distribution F and support Θ.
Utility is given by
u(c0)− h
(
n0
θ0
)
+βu(c1). (1)
We assume that u and h are twice differentiable, u is concave, h is convex, and that u and
h satisfy the Inada conditions u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0, and h′(0) = 0.
The technology is specified by a linear production function in labor and capital. An
allocation specifies consumption and labor for each agent as a function of productivity
(c(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)). The resource constraints are then
ˆ
c0(θ0) dF(θ0) + K1 ≤
ˆ
n0(θ0) dF(θ0) + RK0, (2)ˆ
c1(θ0) dF(θ0) ≤ RK1.
Here K1 denotes aggregate capital with gross rate of return R > 0.
Following Mirrlees (1971), we assume that an agent’s productivity, θ0, and work effort,
e0, are privately observed. Only effective labor n0 = e0 · θ0 and consumption are publicly
observable. This leads us to study efficient allocations and the tax systems that implement
them. By the revelation principle, any allocation that is attainable by some mechanism or
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tax system must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
u(c0(θ0))− h
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
+ βu(c1(θ0)) ≥ u(c0(θ′0))− h
(n0(θ′0)
θ0
)
+ βu(c1(θ′0)) . (3a)
Under a direct mechanism, the agent is asked to report productivity and is assigned con-
sumption and labor as a function of this report. The constraint ensures that truth telling
is optimal.
An agent can always choose not to work, which requires
u(c0(θ0))− h
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
+ βu(c1(θ0)) ≥ (1+ β)u(0)− h(0). (3b)
Although this constraint is often ignored, omitting it amounts to assuming that agents
can be forced to choose work within the equilibrium set {n0(θ0)}θ0∈Θ, which requires
some punishment other than the withholding of consumption. We add this restriction
to the incentive constraints to capture the idea that all incentives are provided through
consumption.
For any allocation we can define the labor wedge or implicit marginal tax on labor
τn(θ0) for an agent with productivity θ0 as
h′
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
u′(c0(θ0))
= θ0 (1− τn(θ0))
and the intertemporal wedge or implicit marginal tax on capital τk(θ0) for an agent with
productivity θ0 as
u′(c0(θ0)) = βR(1− τk(θ0))u′(c1(θ0)).
Of the two wedges, in this paper we are mainly concerned with the latter.
We say that an allocation is efficient if it maximize the utilitarian objective
ˆ (
u(c0(θ0))− h
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
+ βu(c1(θ0))
)
dF(θ0)
subject to the resource and incentive compatibility constraints. Efficient allocations solve
the dual planning problem
min
{c0(θ0),c1(θ0),n0(θ0),K0,K1}
K0 (4)
subject to the resource constraints (2), the incentive constraints (3a) and
ˆ (
u(c0(θ0))− h
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
+ βu(c1(θ0))
)
dF(θ0) ≥ U¯. (5)
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Efficient allocations do not distort the intertemporal consumption choice. The implicit
marginal tax on capital is zero.
Proposition 1. Let {c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)} be an efficient allocation of the commitment economy.
Then
τk(θ0) = 0 ∀θ0 ∈ Θ.
This result follows as a corollary of the celebrated uniform taxation result by Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976). They showed that when preferences for a group of goods are weakly
separable from work effort, these goods should be uniformly taxed, to avoid distortions
in their relative consumption. In our case, the consumption pair over both periods (c0, c1)
is weakly separable from work effort n0 in the first period and the result applies.
This establishes an important benchmark for the results that follow. In our economy
capital taxation should be zero. Any deviation from this principle arises from the lack of
commitment.
3 Lack of Commitment and Capital Taxation
We now depart from the assumption of full commitment and consider a form of limited
commitment which imposes an additional restriction on allocations. We call this new re-
striction the credibility constraint. In this section we motivate the credibility constraint
somewhat informally and study the implications of imposing it on the planning prob-
lem. In the next section we study an explicit dynamic policy game where the credibility
constraint emerges as a characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
The credibility constraint is motivated as follows. When period t = 1 comes along
the original plan calls for the consumption assignment c1(·) to be carried out. Imagine,
however, that this plan can be reformed in favor of an alternative assignment cˆ(·). To
determine whether a reform takes place, the original assignment is compared to the re-
formed one using a utilitarian criterion,
´
u(c(θ0))dF(θ0) versus
´
u(cˆ(θ0))dF(θ0). This
captures a preference for equality that is key for our results. As we review later, the
utilitarian criterion can be justified by embedding our economy in a probabilistic voting
game. For now, it is simpler to proceed taking this criterion as given.
To avoid trivial solutions, we assume a reform costs κ ≥ 0 units of goods, implying
the resource constraint ˆ
cˆ(θ0) dF(θ0) ≤ RK1 − κ. (6)
If a reform takes place, the criterion
´
u(cˆ(θ0))dF(θ0) is maximized by a constant con-
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sumption level:
cˆ1(θ0) = RK1 − κ.
Comparing the two alternatives, it follows that a reform can be avoided if and only if
ˆ
u
(
c1(θ0)
)
dF(θ0) ≥ u(RK1 − κ). (7)
One may interpret the fixed cost literally, perhaps as the opportunity cost of timely
legislative procedures. However, its real purpose here is to allow for a simple form of
limited commitment in our finite horizon setting. At one extreme, the case with κ = ∞ ef-
fectively delivers full commitment, as in the previous section. Indeed, the same outcome
obtains for finite but high enough values of κ. At the other extreme, when κ = 0 there is
no commitment and reform is imminent. Intermediate values of κ capture intermediate
levels of commitment. Later, when we study a stationary overlapping generations econ-
omy, with an infinite horizon, we dispense with this fixed cost and study reputational
equilibria, sustained by trigger strategies.
We say that allocations are credible if they satisfy inequality (7). An allocation that
does not satisfy this inequality is not credible in the sense that it can be anticipated
that a reform would take place in period t = 1. Because reforms are costly, it is best
to avoid them. Thus, we consider allocations that maximize the utilitarian objective´ (
u(c0(θ0))− h
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
+ βu(c1(θ0))
)
dF(θ0) subject to the resource, incentive and cred-
ibility constraints. This leads us to study the dual planning problem
min
{c(θ0),c1(θ0),n0(θ0),K0,K1}
K0 (8)
subject to the resource constraints (2), the incentive constraints (3a), the credibility con-
straint (7) ˆ (
u(c0(θ0))− h
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
+ βu(c1(θ0))
)
dF(θ0) ≥ U¯. (9)
Lack of commitment captures the idea that work effort has already taken place in period
t = 0, so that incentives are no longer required, and equality is desirable in period t = 1.
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3.1 Optimal Progressive Capital Taxation
Let {c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)} be a solution to the dual planning problem. Consider the fol-
lowing variation around this optimum:
u(c˜0(θ0)) = u(c0(θ0))− βδ1(θ0)
u(c˜1(θ0)) = u(c1(θ0)) + δ1(θ0)
for any function δ1(·) and n˜0(θ0) = n0(θ0). This perturbed allocation is incentive compati-
ble and delivers the same utility as {c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)}. Thus, we can drop the promise
keeping constraint (9) and the incentive constraints (3a) and minimize K0 subject to the
resource constraints (2) and the credibility constraint (7). Then the function δ1(θ) = 0 for
all θ ∈ Θ is a solution to
min
{δ1,K0,K1}
K0
subject to
ˆ
c(u(c0(θ0))− βδ1(θ0)) dF(θ0) + K1 ≤
ˆ
n0(θ0) dF(θ0) + RK0, (10)ˆ
c(u(c1(θ0)) + δ1(θ0)) dF(θ0) ≤ RK1,
and ˆ
u
(
c1(θ0) + δ1(θ0)
)
dF(θ0) ≥ u(RK1 − κ). (11)
Let µ0 and µ1 be the multipliers on the resource constraints in (10) and ν be the multi-
plier on the credibility constraint (11). Then we have the following first order conditions:
ν+ µ0β
1
u′(c0(θ0))
− µ1 1u′(c1(θ0)) = 0,
−νRu′(RK1 − κ)− µ0 + Rµ1 = 0,
and
1− Rµ0 = 0.
These first order conditions can easily be rearranged to prove the following result.
Proposition 2. Let {c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)} be an efficient allocation of the no-commitment econ-
omy. Suppose that κ is low enough so that the full commitment solution is not feasible, and the
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credibility constraint is strictly binding. Then there exists ν > 0 such that for all θ0 ∈ Θ
τk(θ0) =
R νµ0 (u
′(RK1 − κ)− u′(c1(θ0)))
1+ R νµ0 (u
′(RK1 − κ)− u′(c1(θ0))) (12)
where µ0 = 1R > 0.
Several implications follow from this simple formula. First, capital taxation is progres-
sive in the sense that the implicit marginal tax is increasing in consumption c1(θ0). Sec-
ond, the sign of the marginal tax is determined by the sign of u′(RK1 − κ)− u′(c1(θ0)),
which depends on θ0. Indeed, for the agent consuming the most we have RK1 − κ =´
c1(θ0) dF(θ0)− κ < maxθ0 c1(θ0) ensuring that the marginal tax rate on capital is posi-
tive at the top. Similarly, for the credibility constraint to bind, it must be the case that con-
sumption at the bottom is lower than consumption after a reform: minθ0 c1(θ0) < RK1− κ.
This implies that the marginal tax rate on capital is negative at the bottom.
Corollary 1. Suppose that κ is low enough so that the full commitment solution is not feasible,
and the credibility constraint is strictly binding. Then the implicit marginal tax rate τk(θ0) is
strictly increasing in θ0, positive at the top, supθ0∈Θ τ
k(θ0) > 0, and negative at the bottom
infθ0∈Θ τ
k(θ0) < 0.
The magnitude and sign of the marginal tax rate is driven by u′(RK1− κ)− u′(c1(θ0))
because this determines the net effect on the credibility constraint of an additional unit of
capital held by an agent with productivity θ0. This raises individual consumption, and
thus raises the left hand side of the credibility constraint. At the same time, more capital
raises the right hand side of the credibility constraint, the value of reforming. The former
effect is smaller, the higher is θ0 because the date 1 consumption c1(θ0) increases with θ0;
the latter effect is independent of θ0. Indeed, for high enough θ0 the net effect is that the
constraint becomes tighter; the opposite is true for low enough θ0. This explains the signs
at the top and bottom.
The economic intuition is best understood by imagining an initial allocation that does
not distort savings, that is, that satisfies Atkinson-Stiglitz’s prescription. Suppose further
that Rβ = 1 so that each individual’s consumption is constant over time, c0(θ0) = c1(θ0).
Of course, some inequality is needed to provide incentives for work effort. The credibility
of this allocation can be improved by reducing the inequality in the second period. This is
accomplished while holding constant the lifetime utility of each individual by tilting the
consumption of the rich towards the first period and that of the poor towards the second
period. Since lifetime utility is unchanged, the same incentives are provided, but because
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inequality falls in the second period, credibility is improved. The cost of this allocation
increases because we deviate from perfect consumption smoothing, but this effect is of
second order. In essence, it is optimal to frontload the provision of incentives.
This example highlights that the progressivity in the taxation of capital reflects an
important features of the allocation: individual consumption is mean reverting. Agents
with higher consumption have lower consumption growth. This requires that they face
lower after-tax rates of return, which requires progressivity in marginal taxes on capital.
3.2 Implementation with Taxes
We now provide a simple tax system that implements incentive compatible allocations
using two separate nonlinear tax schedules, one for labor income and another for capital
income. Agents face the following budget constraints:
c0 + k1 ≤ n0 − Tn(n0) + Rk0,
c1 ≤ Rk1 − Tk(Rk1).
(13)
In the first period, after observing their productivity θ0, agents make consumption, c0,
saving, k1, and labor, n0, choices. In the second period agents simply consume their after
tax wealth. Given tax schedules Tn and Tk, a competitive equilibrium is an allocation
{c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)} and {k1(θ0)} such that (i) agents optimize: each agent θ0 maxi-
mizes their utility (1) subject to (13); and (ii) markets clear: the resource constraints (2)
hold with equality. We say that tax schedules (Tn, Tk) implement an incentive compat-
ible allocation {c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)} if the latter is a competitive equilibrium for some
{k1(θ0)}. Our implementation result can now be simply stated.
Proposition 3. Suppose {c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0)} is incentive compatible and nondecreasing in
θ0. Then there exist tax schedules (Tn, Tk) that implement this allocation as a competitive equi-
librium.
Incentive compatibility requires n0(θ0) and u(c0(θ0))+ βu(c1(θ0)) to be nondecreasing
in θ0. Efficient allocations with or without commitment feature nondecreasing c0(θ0) and
c1(θ0). Thus, they can be implemented by separable tax schedules.
If the tax schedules are locally differentiable, then the first-order conditions for agent
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θ0 imply
h′
(n0(θ0)
θ0
)
u′(c0(θ0))
= θ0
(
1− Tn′(n0(θ0))
)
, (14)
u′(c0(θ0)) = βR(1− Tk′(Rk1(θ0)))u′(c1(θ0)). (15)
In other words, marginal taxes equal implicit marginal taxes Tn′(n0(θ0)) = τn(θ0) and
Tk′(Rk1(θ0)) = τk(θ0). Indeed, Tk(Rk1) is everywhere differentiable and Tn(n0) is differ-
entiable at points where no bunching occurs, i.e. at points where n0(θ0) is locally strictly
increasing. The corollary below spells out the implications for the capital income tax
schedule and its derivative.
Corollary 2. (i) Consider an efficient allocation of the commitment economy. Then it can be
implemented with a nonlinear income tax Tn and a zero tax on capital Tk(Rk1) = 0.
(ii) Consider an efficient allocation of the no-commitment economy and suppose that the credibility
constraint (7) is strictly binding. Then it can be implemented with tax schedules (Tn, Tk). The tax
on capital Tk is convex and differentiable. The marginal tax rate is positive at the top Tk′(Rk¯1) > 0
and negative at the bottom Tk′(Rk1) < 0, where k¯1 ≡ maxθ0 k1(θ0) and k1 = minθ0 k1(θ0).
These results translate our previous implications for implicit marginal tax rates into
implications for explicit tax systems. They also allow us to reinterpret the planning prob-
lem in terms of a choice over tax systems, instead of allocations. The no-commitment
economy maximizes over tax schedules (Tn, Tk) that are credible, in the sense of avoid-
ing a tax reform. In the second period a tax reform amounts to replacing the tax schedule
for capital income Tk with a capital levy that completely expropriates capital: Tˆk(Rk1) =
Rk1 − RK1 + κ. Note that this reformed tax schedule Tˆk features a marginal tax that is
constant and equal to 100%. Thus, our results on the progressivity of Tk are not obtained
because of a similar progressivity in Tˆk.
3.3 Probabilistic voting
We motivated the credibility constraint by considering a utilitarian planner with no com-
mitment. We now provide political economy underpinnings for both the lack of com-
mitment and the utilitarian social welfare function. Indeed, efficient allocations of the
no-commitment economy can be interpreted as the solution of an explicit political econ-
omy game, following the probabilistic voting model along the lines of Coughlin (1986)
and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) which is well known to lead to an outcome that maxi-
mizes a utilitarian objective. Our purpose here is to sketch how these arguments adapt to
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our setting.
In the political economy game policies are decided as the outcome of an election. At
the beginning of each period t = 0, 1 two candidates i = A, B face off in an election. The
winner is determined by simple majority. Voting behavior is described further below.
Candidates attempt to maximize the probability of winning the election. Before voting
takes place, candidates present their platforms to the electorate, publicly stating the poli-
cies they will pursue if elected.
In period t = 0 a platform consists of taxes (Tn,i0 , T
k,i
0 ). After the election, if candidate
i∗ is the winner then he holds office for one period and is committed to implementing
the proposed platform. In period t = 0 this entails enacting both taxes into law. The tax
on labor Tn,i
∗
0 is then immediately implemented. The tax on capital T
k,i∗
0 remains on the
books and takes effect in period t = 1 if it is not reformed. At this point, agents make
their consumption, saving and labor choices (c0,i
∗
0 (θ0), k
0,i∗
1 (θ0), n
0,i∗
0 (θ0)).
In period t = 1 a new election takes place. This is the source of the lack of commitment.
Candidates take the distribution of capital k0,i
∗
1 (θ0) and the previously enacted tax on
capital Tk,i
∗
0 as given and present platforms consisting of a tax on capital T
k,i
1 . Once again,
if candidate j∗ is the winner, then he must implement Tk,j
∗
1 . If the corresponding capital
tax schedule Tk,j
∗
1 differs from the schedule enacted in the previous period, T
k,i∗
0 then the
economy incurs a resource cost κ.
In period t = 0 agents consider the welfare implications of platforms j = A, B, com-
puting
vj0(θ0) = u(c
0,j
0 (θ0)) + βu(c
0,j
1 (θ0))− h
(
n0,j0 (θ0)
θ0
)
j = A, B,
where (c0,j0 (θ0), c
0,j
1 (θ0), n
0,j
0 (θ0)) denotes the allocation that results if candidate j wins in
period t = 0. Likewise, in period t = 1 agents compute
vj1(θ0) = u(c
1,j
1 (θ0)) j = A, B,
where c1,j1 (θ0) denotes the allocation that results if candidate j wins in period t = 1.
In deciding which candidate to cast their vote for, agents care about the sum of two
variables: the welfare implied by the platform and an idiosyncratic candidate-specific
taste shock. In period t, an agent i with productivity θ0 votes for A over B if and only if
vAt (θ0) + ε
i,A > vBt (θ0) + ε
i,B; (16)
ties are broken by voting with equal probability for each candidate.
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The ε shock captures ideological preferences, fondness based on a candidate’s person-
ality, or any other consideration that leads individuals not to vote entirely based on their
self interest. It implies that for each productivity type θ0, voters take different sides in
the election. As a result, candidates choose their platform with an eye to pleasing agents
across the productivity spectrum. This is in sharp contrast to the median voter setup,
where there is a single type θ0 that is the marginal voter and candidates cater their plat-
form to this single agent.
We assume that ∆iε = εi,B − εi,A is independent of θ0. The probability that platform A
wins the election is then given by
ˆ
G
(
vAt (θ0)− vBt (θ0)
)
dF(θ0) (17)
where G is the distribution for ∆ε. The political equilibrium takes a very simple form
when the distribution for ∆ε is uniform on an interval [−mε, mε] that is wide relative to
the range of agent utilities. The assumption that agent utility is bounded and that mε is
large relative to that bound ensures that vAt (θ0)− vBt (θ0) lies in the interior of the support
of ∆ε.56
Since the cumulative distribution function in (17) is linear in the interior of the support,
G
(
vAt (θ0)− vBt (θ0)
)
=
(
vAt (θ0)− vBt (θ0)
)
/(2mε), each candidate positions its platform to
maximize the utilitarian welfare criterion
ˆ
vt(θ0) dF(θ0). (18)
Since both candidates choose the same platform, both are elected with equal probability.
It follows that the subgame perfect equilibria of this political economy game coincide
with efficient allocations of the no-commitment economy.
4 Overlapping Generations
We now turn to an infinite horizon overlapping generations economy. This allows us to
study the credibility problem as a dynamic game. In contrast to the two-period version,
we do not introduce an exogenous cost of reform. Instead, good policies are sustained by
5 Assuming the density is uniform simplifies the analysis but is not critical. As is well known, the
same results would obtain for a larger class of non-uniform distributions that ensures that the candidates’
platform problem is sufficiently convex.
6The upper bound on effective labor is finite n¯ < ∞. There exists a bound M > 0 such that for all c,
n < n¯ and θ, |u(c)− h(n/θ)| < M. Moreover, 2M(1+ β) < mε.
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a concern for shaping private expectations regarding future policy. Formally, we consider
reputational equilibria, in which the threat of reversion to a less desirable equilibrium
deters deviations from a good equilibrium.
4.1 Model Setup
The time horizon is infinite with period t = 0, 1, . . . The economy is populated by over-
lapping generations of agents that live for two periods. Agents born in period t work only
when young, nt, and consume when young and old, c
y
t and c
o
t+1, in periods t and t + 1.
An agent with productivity θt that exerts work effort et delivers nt = et · θt effective
units of labor. Agents’ productivities are i.i.d. draws from a distribution F with support
Θ. Productivity and effort are private information; effective labor and consumption are
observable.
The utility of an agent of generation t is given by
u(cyt )− h
(
nt
θt
)
+βu(cot+1). (19)
We assume that u and h are twice differentiable, u is concave, h is convex, and that they
satisfy the Inada conditions u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0, and h′(0) = 0.
The resource constraint in period t is given by:
Cyt + C
o
t + Kt+1 ≤ F(Kt, Nt) (20)
where Cyt =
´
cy,it di is aggregate consumption of young agents (indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]),
Cot =
´
co,jt dj is aggregate consumption of old agents (indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]), Nt =
´
nitdi
is aggregate labor of the young, and Kt is aggregate capital. The production function F is
assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, strictly increasing and continuously differen-
tiable.
Policy decisions are made by a sequence of governments indexed by t = 0, 1, . . . Gov-
ernment t cares only about agents that are currently alive and evaluates welfare according
to the utilitarian criterion
E˜t
[
λ
ˆ
u(co,jt )dj + (1− λ)
ˆ (
u(cy,it )− h
(
nit
θit
)
+ βu(co,it+1)
)
di
]
with relative weights λ and 1− λ on the old and young, respectively. Here E˜t denotes the
beliefs of government t.
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The Policy Game. Informally, the sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning
of period t the capital stock Kt and all past actions are given and publicly known. Each
young agent then privately observes its own productivity θit and chooses labor n
i
t. At
the end of the period output F(Kt,
´
nitdi) becomes available. The current government
chooses a consumption assignment for the young and the old, as a function of their labor
choice, as well as the level of capital for next period. The only constraint at this point is
the resource constraint.
Note that once agents’ labor decisions are sunk the government can distribute con-
sumption equally. In this sense, the government has no commitment device to provide
incentives.
We incorporate the following restrictions on strategies. We restrict attention to sym-
metric pure strategies for agents such that agents with the same productivity take the
same action, i.e. θit = θ
j
t with i 6= j implies nit = njt. We also restrict attention to strategies
for agents and governments that react to labor choices {nit}i∈[0,1] only through the implied
distribution of labor. In this sense, agents are treated anonymously.7
Formally, the game is described as follows. The relevant public history Ht at the begin-
ning of period t consists of the sequence of past government choices and the distribution
of private choices for labor:
Ht =
{
Ht−1, c¯ot−1(·), c¯yt−1(·), Kt, Gt−1
}
for t = 1, 2, . . . and H0 = {K0, G−1}. Here c¯ot (·) is a function that maps the period t− 1
effective labor njt−1 of agent j of generation t− 1 into current consumption. Similarly, the
function c¯yt (·) maps the effective labor nit of agent i of generation t into current consump-
tion. Finally, Gt denotes the cumulative distribution function for {nit}i∈[0,1].
Within period t there are two stages:
1. Productivities {θit}i∈[0,1] of young agents are realized. Agent i privately observes θit
and chooses labor nit. Output F(Kt, Nt) is produced.
2. The current government observes Ht and the distribution Gt of current labor choices.
Let Hˆt = {Ht, Gt} be the corresponding interim history. The current government
then chooses current policy c¯ot (·), c¯yt (·) and Kt+1 subject to the resource constraint.
This timing assumption is slightly different than that of our two-period economy. The
government here decides consumption for the young after their labor choices are sunk.
7These two restrictions, symmetry and anonymity, are commonly imposed in the analysis of policy
games. For example, they are imposed by Chari and Kehoe (1990) to define their notion of sustainable
plans in the context of their Ramsey policy game.
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This implies a stronger form of lack of commitment, in that there is no commitment even
within a period.8
We now define strategies. In period t, each young agent observes the public history
Ht and the private shock θt. We denote an agent’s strategy by σt(Ht, θt), so that the labor
choice made by agent i is given by nit = σt(Ht, θ
i
t).
9 The strategy of government t is
described by τt ≡ (τc,ot (Hˆt, ·), τc,yt (Hˆt, ·), τKt (Hˆt)), implying policies c¯ot (·) = τc,ot (Hˆt, ·),
c¯yt (·) = τc,yt (Hˆt, ·), and Kt+1 = τKt (Hˆt).
We denote the strategies of all generations of agents by σ ≡ {σt}∞t=0 and those of
governments by τ ≡ {τt}∞t=0. We focus on Perfect Bayesian equilibria for this dynamic
game.
We specialize our study of equilibria to the case where G−1 is the cumulative dis-
tribution function of {σ−1(θ−1)}θ−1∈Θ for some exogenous function σ−1 and we include
this function in H0. Given a history Ht, the strategies (σ, τ) determine labor for agents
and the government policy in period t. These actions then generate an updated his-
tory Ht+1. Proceeding in this way and starting from t = 0, we can define the entire se-
quence {Ht}∞t=0 and the corresponding allocation outcome defined by nt(θt) = σt(Ht, θt),
cyt (θt) = τ
c,y
t (Hˆt, σt(Ht, θt)), c
o
t (θt−1) = τ
c,o
t (Hˆt, σt−1(Ht−1, θt−1)) and Kt+1 = τKt (Hˆt). We
rank outcomes according to a utilitarian welfare measure placing weight λt on the welfare
of generation t:
U = λ−1
ˆ
u (co0(θ−1)) dF(θ−1)
+
∞
∑
t=0
λt
ˆ (
u
(
cyt (θt)
)− h(nt(θt)
θt
)
+ βu(cot+1(θt))
)
dF(θt).
We are interested in characterizing the best equilibrium from the perspective of this ob-
jective. We work with the dual problem: K0, such that there exists an equilibrium with
associated utility equal to U.
Following Chari and Kehoe (1990), we next develop a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for an allocation to be the outcome of an equilibrium. We term these allocation
outcomes sustainable. Studying the best equilibrium is then reduced to a constrained
programming problem.
8An alternative timing assumption is to allow the government to commit within a period to a rule for
consumption for the young (or to some tax schedules). One difficulty is that, in order to satisfy the resource
constraint, one must consider commitment to rules that adjust with the realized distributions of labor Gt.
For this reason, this model is technically harder to work with but has similar implications.
9Note that the strategy does not depend on i, capturing our restriction to symmetric strategies.
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4.2 Sustainable Allocations and the Credibility Constraint
An allocation
({cot , cyt , nt}t≥0, {Kt}t≥0) consists of sequences of consumption functions for
the old cot : Θ → R+, consumption functions for the young cyt : Θ → R+, labor supply
functions nt : Θt → R+, and capital stocks Kt ∈ R+. We denote by Cyt =
´
cyt dF(θt) the
aggregate consumption of young agents, Cot =
´
cot (θt−1) the aggregate consumption of
old agents, and Nt =
´
nt(θt)dF(θt) the aggregate labor of the young. We denote by Gt is
the cumulative distribution function for labor in period t of {nt(θt)}θt∈Θ .
Feasible allocations. The allocation is incentive compatible if for all t
u(cyt (θt))− h
(nt(θt)
θt
)
+ βu(cot+1(θt)) ≥ u(cyt (θ′t))− h
(nt(θ′t)
θt
)
+ βu(cot+1(θ
′
t)) ∀θt,θt’∈ Θ,
u(cyt (θt))− h
(nt(θt)
θt
)
+ βu(cot+1(θt)) ≥ (1+ β)u(0)− h(0). (21)
We say that an allocation
({cot , cyt , nt}, Kt) is feasible if: (i) it is incentive compatible; (ii)
it satisfies the following resource constraint for every t:
ˆ
c0t (θt−1)dF(θt−1) +
ˆ
cyt (θt)dF(θt) ≤ F
(
Kt,
ˆ
nt(θt)dF(θt)
)− Kt+1. (22)
Sustainable allocations. We say that an allocation
({cot , cyt , nt}t≥0, {Kt}t≥0) is sustainable
if it is the outcome of an equilibrium. Following Chari and Kehoe (1990), we can derive a
simple set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a feasible allocation to be the outcome
of an equilibrium.
Consider a function W˜(K, G−). In any period t we define the credibility constraint as
the following inequality:
λ
ˆ
u(c0t (θt−1))dF(θt−1) + (1− λ)
ˆ (
u(cyt (θt)) + βu(c
o
t+1(θt))
)
dF(θt)
≥ Wˆ (Kt, Gt; W˜) , (23)
where
Wˆ(K, G; W˜) = max
co,cy,K′
{
λu(co) + (1− λ) (u(cy) + βW˜(K′, G))} (24)
subject to the resource constraint c0 + cy + K′ ≤ F(K, ´ ndG(n)).
We say that an allocation is sustainable given W˜ if: (i) it is feasible; and (ii) it satisfies
the sequence of credibility constraints (23).
Given a pair of equilibrium strategies (σR, τR), we denote by W(σR,τR)(K, G−) the asso-
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ciated equilibrium value for the expected payoff of the initial old
´
u (cˆo0(n−1)) dG−1(n−1)
when the initial history is given by K0 = K and G−1 = G−. We can then construct trigger
strategies that revert to (σR, τR) upon a deviation. The following proposition character-
izes the allocations that are outcomes of such equilibria.
Proposition 4. Let (σR, τR) be a pair of equilibrium strategies. An allocation is sustainable given
W(σR,τR) if and only if it is the outcome of an equilibrium with trigger strategies reverting to
(σR, τR) upon a deviation.
Let (σR, τR) be a pair of equilibrium strategies and consider a trigger strategy equilib-
rium in which a deviation is followed by a reversion to (σR, τR). The credibility constraint
ensures that the period t government prefers the equilibrium outcome to deviating. For
a period t government the benefits of a deviation are threefold. First, the government
can equalize the consumption of the old. Just as in the two period model, work effort for
generation t− 1 has already taken place in period t− 1, so that incentives are no longer
required, and equality in consumption for the old in period t is desirable for the utili-
tarian objective. Second, the government can equalize consumption of the young: work
effort for generation t has already taken place in the first stage of period t, so that incen-
tives are no longer required, and equality in consumption for young agents in period t
is desirable for the utilitarian objective. Finally, the government can achieve its optimal
balance (depending on the relative Pareto weight λ) between the consumption of the old,
the consumption of the young, and is also free to choose the level of capital for the next
period. These benefits are reflected in the definition of Wˆ, which incorporates that there
is no consumption inequality within a generation and that the level of consumption for
the young, consumption for the old and capital are chosen freely. The period t govern-
ment must weigh these benefits against the fact that the deviation triggers a reversion to
(σR, τR) in period t + 1, so that the average utility for its old will be W(σR,τR), as reflected
in the definition of Wˆ.10
The greatest deterrent is achieved by the lowest possible value for W(σR,τR), which we
call the worst and denote by W(K, G−) = inf W(σR,τR)(K, G−) where the infimum is over
pairs of equilibrium strategies (σR, τR). The next proposition shows that the worst can be
used to characterize the entire set of equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 5. If an allocation is the outcome of an equilibrium, then it is sustainable given the
worst W. Conversely, suppose that there exists a pair of equilibrium strategies (σWR , τ
W
R ) leading
10Note that we do not include the disutility of labor on the left-hand side of equation (23) and in the
definition of Wˆ. This simplification arises from the fact that the period t government chooses policies after
generation t agents have made their labor supply decisions.
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to the worst W(σ
W
R ,τ
W
R )(K, G−) = W(K, G−). Take any allocation that is sustainable given W.
Then this allocation is the outcome of an equilibrium with trigger strategies reverting to (σWR , τ
W
R )
upon a deviation.
Efficient allocations. For any allocation, we can compute the associated utility
U
({cot , cyt , nt}, Kt) = λ−1 ˆ u (co0(θ−1)) dF(θ−1)
+
∞
∑
t=0
λt
ˆ (
u(cyt (θt))− h
(
nt(θt)
θt
)
+ βu(cot+1(θt))
)
dF(θt).
For a given U, we define an allocation to be efficient given W˜ if it solves the following
planning problem:
min
{c0t ,cyt ,nt}t≥0,{Kt}t≥0
K0 (25)
subject to
({c0t , cyt , nt}t≥0, {Kt}t≥0) being a sustainable allocation given W˜ and the con-
straint that U
({cot , cyt , nt}, Kt) ≥ U.
There are similarities and differences in the determinants of credibility constraints in
the overlapping generations planning problem (25) and in the two period planning prob-
lem (8) of Section 3. In both models, there is a benefit from deviating in order to equal-
ize the consumption of the old, who have exerted work effort in the previous period.
In the overlapping generations setting, there are two additional benefits from deviating:
equalizing consumption for the young who have exerted effort earlier in the period, and
achieving an optimal balance between consumption of the old and consumption of the
young. These benefits are absent in the two period model in which there is only one gen-
eration: there are only old agents and no young agents at the time when a deviation is
considered. The costs of a deviation are also slightly different. In the overlapping genera-
tions model, the cost of a deviation comes in the future in the form of a bad continuation
equilibrium for the old in the next period. In the two period model, the cost of a deviation
comes in the same period in the form of a waste of resources.
A roadmap. Suppose that there exists a pair of equilibrium strategies (σWR , τ
W
R ) leading
to the worst. Then efficient allocations given W solve the problem that we set out to
answer: these allocations are the ouctomes of equilibria with associated utility equal to U
which use the least initial resources K0. More generally, efficient allocations given W(σR,τR)
are the outcomes of the trigger equilibria which use the least amount of initial resources
K0 among the equilibria which revert to (σR, τR) upon a deviation and have associated
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utility equal to U.
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we provide a characterization of efficient allocations given any
function W˜ such that Wˆ(K, G; W˜) is increasing and differentiable in K. We can then apply
these results to the case where W˜ = W(σR,τR) or W˜ = W in order to obtain character-
izations and implementations of the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of the policy
game. In Section 4.5, we provide sufficient conditions for Wˆ(K, G; W) to be increasing
and differentiable in K.
4.3 Optimal Progressive Capital Taxation
For any allocation, period t and productivity θt ∈ Θ, we can define the labor wedge or
implicit marginal tax on labor τnt (θt) as
h′
(nt(θt)
θt
)
u′(cyt (θt))
= θtFN
(
Kt, Nt
)
(1− τnt (θt))
and the intertemporal wedge or implicit marginal tax on capital τkt (θt) as
u′(ct(θt)) = βFK
(
Kt+1, Nt+1
)
(1− τkt+1(θt))u′(cot+1(θt)).
We can derive necessary conditions for optimality in the planning problem (25) exactly
as in Section 3. Putting multipliers {µt}t≥0 and {νt}t≥0 on the resource constraints (22)
and the credibility constraints (23), we can derive two key necessary first order conditions:
λνt+1 + µtβ
1
u′(cyt (θt))
− µt+1 1u′(cot+1(θt))
= 0
and
−νt+1WˆK(Kt+1, Nt+1)− µt + FK(Kt+1, Nt+1)µt+1 = 0.
These first order conditions can easily be rearranged to prove the following result.
Proposition 6. Consider a function W˜(K, G−) and assume that Wˆ(K, G; W˜) is increasing and
differentiable in K. Let
({cot , cyt , nt}t≥0, {Kt}t≥0) be an efficient allocation given W˜. Then there
exist positive multipliers {µt}t≥0 and {νt}t≥0 such that for all t and θt ∈ Θ,
τkt+1(θt) =
νt+1
µt
FK(Kt+1, Nt+1)(
WˆK(Kt+1,Gt+1;W˜)
FK(Kt+1,Nt+1;W˜)
− λu′(cot+1(θt)))
1+ νt+1µt FK(Kt+1, Nt+1)(
WˆK(Kt+1,Gt+1;W˜)
FK(Kt+1,Nt+1);W˜)
− λu′(cot+1(θt)))
. (26)
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This proposition is the exact analogue for the dynamic overlapping generations setting
of Proposition 2 proved in context of a two period economy.
Let
(
cˆo(K, G; W˜), cˆy(K, G; W˜), K′(K, G; W˜)
)
be the allocation following a deviation—
the solution of program (24). Applying the Envelope theorem, we find that WˆK(K, G; W˜) =
λFK(K, N; W˜)u′(cˆo(K, G; W˜)). Hence we can rewrite the formula for the implicit marginal
tax rate on capital (26) as follows:
τkt+1(θt) =
νt+1
µt
λFK(Kt+1, Nt+1)(u′(cˆo(Kt+1, Gt+1; W˜))− u′(cot+1(θt)))
1+ νt+1µt λFK(Kt+1, Nt+1)(u
′(cˆo(Kt+1, Gt+1; W˜))− u′(cot+1(θt)))
. (27)
Exactly as in the two period model, the magnitude and sign of the marginal tax rate
τkt+1(θt) is driven by u
′(cˆo(Kt+1, Gt+1; W˜)) − u′(cot+1(θt)) because this determines how
much an additional unit of capital saved in the hands of an agent with productivity θt
tightens the credibility constraint. An extra unit of capital at date t + 1 raises individual
consumption, and thus raises the left hand side of the date t + 1 credibility constraint.
At the same time, more capital raises the right hand side of the date t + 1 credibility
constraint, the value of deviating. The former effect is smaller, the higher is θt because
the equilibrium marginal utility of old age consumption u′(cot+1(θt)) decreases with θt.
The latter effect is independent of θt because the marginal uitlity of old age consumption
u′(cˆo(Kt+1, Gt+1; W˜)) after a deviation is independent of θt.
4.4 Tax Implementation
Proceeding as in Section 3 we provide a simple tax system that implements the efficient
allocation. Let Wt be the wage and Rt − 1 be the rental rate of capital. Firms rent labor
and capital and seek to maximize profits F(kt, nt)−Wtnt− Rtkt. Agents are subject to the
following budget constraint
cyt + kt+1 ≤Wtnt − Tnt (Wtnt),
cot+1 ≤ Rt+1kt+1 − Tkt+1(Rt+1kt+1).
(28)
After observing their productivity θt agents make consumption, saving and labor choices.
Given prices {Wt, Rt}t≥0 and tax schedules {Tnt , Tkt }, a competitive equilibrium is an allo-
cation
({c0t , cyt , nt}t≥0, {Kt}t≥0) such that (i) agents optimize: each agent maximizes their
utility (1) subject to (28); (ii) firms maximize profits; and (iii) markets clear. We then say
that the tax schedules {Tnt , Tkt } implement the allocation under consideration. As in Sec-
tion 3 this requires that FN(Kt, Nt) = Wt, FK(Kt, Nt) = Rt, and that the marginal tax rates
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Tn′t (nt(θt)) and Tk′t (Rt+1kt+1(θt)) correspond to the implicit marginal tax rates on labor
τnt (θt) and capital τ
k
t+1(θt) of the underlying allocation. The following corollary is a direct
consequence of Propositions 3 and 6.
Corollary 3. Consider a function W˜(K, G−) and assume that Wˆ(K, G; W˜) is increasing and
differentiable in K. For a given U, consider an efficient allocation given W˜. Then it can be imple-
mented with a nonlinear labor income tax Tnt and a nonlinear tax on capital T
k
t . If the credibility
constraint (23) is binding in period t, then tax on capital Tkt is convex, with the marginal tax rate
Tk′t strictly increasing in capital income Rtkt. If the credibility constraint is not binding in period
t, then the tax on capital Tkt is zero.
4.5 Characterizing the worst
The function W(K, G−) does not depend on G−. Slightly abusing notation, we write
W(K). We fully characterize it in the case where the utility function u is bounded below
and F(K, 0) = 0. We show that in this case, the deviation payoff Wˆ(K, G; W) is increasing
and differentiable in K. The fact that Wˆ(K, G; W) is increasing in K is a direct consequence
of its definition.
Proposition 7. (i) For any function W˜(K, G−), the deviation payoff Wˆ(K, G; W˜) is increasing
in K.
(ii) Suppose that the utility function u is bounded below and that F(K, 0) = 0. Then W(K) =
u(0) and Wˆ(K, G; W) is increasing and differentiable in K.
5 Numerical Illustration
In this section we provide an illustrative numerical example. Agents are assumed to have
preferences of the form:
∑
Θ
(
cy(θ)1−σ
1− σ − ψ
(n(θ)/θ)1+γ
1+ γ
+ β
co(θ)1−σ
1− σ
)
f (θ).
The utilitarian welfare weights are assumed to be geometric with λt = δt and, in the
benchmark case, the production function is Cobb-Douglas with F(K, N) = KαN1−α. The
latter assumption implies that Proposition 7 is applicable.11
11We have also computed examples with partial depreciation of capital in which Proposition 7 is not
applicable. This extension greatly complicates the numerical procedure without significantly altering the
results. Our benchmark calibration approximates depreciation to be 100% over 30 years.
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The complete list of parameters for this economy is: {σ,ψ,γ, β, f ,Θ,λ, δ, α}. σ is cho-
sen to be 0.9 which is both consistent with the boundedness of agent utilities and close
to the log specification widely used in macroeconomics. γ is set to 1 implying a constant
Frisch elasticity of 1 which is consistent with values suggested by Kimball and Shapiro
(2008) and Erosa et al. (2010). ψ is set so that at the steady state of a calibrated OLG market
equilibrium, agents work on average about 40% of their time when young. In the bench-
mark economy, β is set to 0.2. Interpreting the model period as 30 years this corresponds
to an annual discount factor of about 0.95. We briefly comment on the implications of
other β choices below. The labor productivity distribution is calibrated using CEX hourly
wage data for the year 2000.12 We suppose that wages are generated by competitive mar-
kets and that the wage of individual i is given by wi = wθi where w is the average wage
and θi the individual’s relative labor productivity. The distribution of θi in the data is
interpreted as the productivity distribution in the calibrated model. We assume that la-
bor productivities in the highest percentile of the distribution are generated according to
a conditional Pareto distribution and extend the distribution accordingly. In the bench-
mark calibration, the societal discount δ is set to 0.5 and the political weighting parameter
λ is set to 0.68. We consider other possible values for δ and λ and briefly describe their
implications below.
We numerically solve for the steady state of the social planning problem (25) with
the parameter values given above. This steady state is described by consumption and
labor functions {cy∗, co∗, n∗} and a capital stock K∗. An explicit statement of the problem
is given in the appendix.
The optimal per annum marginal tax rate is defined to be:
1− τ(θ) =
(
u′(cy∗(θ))
βu′(co∗(θ))
) 1
T − 1
R
1
T − 1
,
where T = 30, the length of the model period, and R is the marginal product of capital in
the model. Figure (1) illustrates this tax for our benchmark case. The calibrated produc-
tivity distribution is also shown. The marginal capital tax rate is increasing and concave
in productivity: unproductive agents face large marginal subsidies and highly productive
agents face positive marginal taxes. This shape of the benchmark marginal tax profile is
common to many other cases that we have computed.
The values of the agent’s discount factor β, the political weight λ and the utilitarian
12The data are from Heathcote et al. (2010) Sample A. Detailed description of the sample is available in
that paper.
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Figure 1: Marginal capital tax.
welfare weight δ are important in determining whether the credibility constraint binds
or not in steady state. Smaller values of β and larger values of λ cause the government
to attach less weight to the future and to the severe outcome that ultimately follows a
defection. This makes the credibility constraint more likely to bind. Higher values of δ
create greater mismatch between the utilitarian and the political objective, again making
the credibility constraint more likely to bind. Changes to these parameters cause the
relative optimal and defection marginal utilities of the old to change which can alter the
sign of the marginal capital taxes at a given productivity. They also change the credibility
multiplier which scales these relative marginal utilities and, hence, the tax function, see
equation (27). These issues are illustrated in Figure (2) for different λ values. For values
below 0.65, the credibility constraint does not bind and marginal capital taxes are 0. As λ
rises, the predominant effect is the pivoting of the tax function caused by the rise in the
credibility multiplier. In economic terms, as the weight of the old in the political system
rises, governments are more tempted to defect. The optimal steady state tax function then
becomes more progressive, suppressing ex post inequality amongst the old and diluting
this temptation.
In the preceding examples, reversion to the worst equilibrium occurred following a
deviation. Figure (3) illustrates a numerical experiment in which political deviations have
milder consequences. Now there is reversion to the worst equilibrium with probability
0.15 and to a Markov equilibrium with probability 0.85. Consequently, defection payoffs
are increased and the credibility constraint binds over a much larger set of (λ, δ) values.
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Figure 2: Marginal capital taxes for various political share, λ, values.
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Figure 3: Marginal asset taxes: Milder punishment equilibrium, λ = 0.4, δ = 0.4.
Figure (3) shows the the optimal tax function for such an equilibrium with λ and δ equal
to 0.4. The monotonicity and approximate concavity of the tax function is preserved, but
taxes are now positive over a much larger range of productivities. The lower value of
λ coupled with reversion to the milder equilibrium causes a defecting political planner
to allocate relatively more resources to the consumption of the young and to capital ac-
cumulation and less to consumption of the old. The lower value of δ contributes to a
relatively greater allocation of consumption to the old at the optimum. Consistent with
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(27), this combination of effects alters relative marginal utilities at the optimum and after
a defection, inducing higher marginal asset taxes.
6 Conclusion
The basic idea behind our result can be stated as follows: in settings where: (a) the credi-
bility of future policies is of concern, and (b) credibility depends on keeping inequality in
check, policies will be put into place to avoid the accumulation of inequality. A progres-
sive tax on capital is one such policy.
Our simple model delivers this sharp result in a transparent way. The main mech-
anism, however, appears robust, so we conjecture that the progressivity of capital tax-
ation is likely to survive a number of extensions. Moreover, perhaps there are similar
implications for other dimensions of policy that may also reduce inequality and promote
credibility, such as educational policies.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider an allocation c0(θ0), c1(θ0), n0(θ0) that satisfies the as-
sumptions of Proposition 3. The implicit capital tax for agent θ0 is given by
τ(θ0) = 1− u
′(c0(θ0))
βRu′(c1(θ0))
.
We define the capital tax schedule Tk as a solution of the following ODE:
Tk′(Rk) = τ
(
c−11 (Rk− Tk(Rk))
)
where c−11 is the inverse of the function c1.
13 This defines a concave function Tk over
c1(Θ). We can extend this function to a concave function Tk over R+. Note that since
τ(θ0) < 1, Rk− Tk(Rk) is strictly increasing in k. Hence we can define the function k(θ0),
increasing in θ0, as follows:
Rk(θ0)− Tk(Rk(θ0)) = c1(θ0).
Define the labor income tax Tn so that
n0(θ0)− c0(θ0)− Tn(n0(θ0)) = k(θ0)
and for n /∈ {n(θ0)}θ0∈Θ , let Tn(n) = n. Let y(θ0) = n0(θ0)− Tn(n0(θ0)).
Consider, for a given level of income y net of labor income tax, the following problem.
Maximize
U(k, c1; y) ≡ u(y− k) + βu(c1) (29)
subject to
c1 = Rk− Tk(Rk).
By construction,
(
k(θ0), c1(θ0)
)
satisfies the first order conditions in (29) when y = y(θ0).
Note that we have the following single crossing property:
∂
(− Uc1Uk )
∂y
> 0
Together with the fact that y(θ0) and c1(θ0) are increasing in θ0, this is enough to en-
13Possible flat portions of c1(θ0) define discontinuous jumps in the inverse function c−11 .
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sure that for y = y(θ0),
(
k(θ0), c1(θ0)
)
attains the maximum in (29). Hence an agent
of type θ0 who supplies n(θ′0) units of effective labor will optimally choose to consume(
c0(θ′0), c1(θ′0)
)
when confronted with the taxes Tn and Tk. Since the original allocation is
incentive compatible, working n(θ0) and consuming
(
c0(θ0), c1(θ0)
)
is the optimal choice
for an agent of type θ0. Moreover, and agent of type θ0 is always better off working n(θ0)
and consuming
(
c0(θ0), c1(θ0)
)
than choosing any n /∈ {n(θ0)}θ0∈Θ and then being forced
to consume 0 in both periods. Therefore, the taxes Tn and Tk implement the allocation.
Proof of Proposition 7 Part (i) follows directly from the definition of Wˆ(K, G; W). Part
(ii) can be proved as follows. Suppose that u is bounded below. Then we necessarily have
W(K) ≥ u(0). When F(K, 0) = 0 and the utility u is bounded below, it is easy to construct
an equilibrium that achieves this expected payoff for the initial old. We now explain how
to construct such an equilibrium.
Agents strategies are defined as follows. For every public history Ht, and shock θt, we
specify σt(Ht, θt) = 0. For every interim history Hˆt, let (co(
´
ntdGt(nt)), cy(
´
ntdGt(nt)))
be the solution of maxco,cy λu(co) + (1− λ)u(cy) subject to co + cy = F(Kt,
´
ntdGt(nt)).
After every interim history Hˆt, the strategy of government t, and for every past labor
choice nt−1 of an old and current labor choice nt of a young, is described by τc,ot (Hˆt, nt−1) =
co(
´
ntdGt(nt)), τ
c,y
t (Hˆt, nt) = c
y(
´
ntdGt(nt)t), and τKt (Hˆt) = 0. It is easy to see that
these strategies form an equilibrium, and that the corresponding equilibrium payoff for
the initial old is given by u(0).
Numerical procedure for the numerical illustration We numerically solve for the steady
state of the social planning problem (25). Specifically, we extract the problem of a single
generation from (25) and obtain multipliers
{
µ∗
χ∗ ,
ν∗
χ∗
}
and an allocation {cy∗, co∗, n∗, K∗}
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such that (i) the allocation maximizes:
χ∗
ˆ (
u(cy(θ))− h
(
n(θ)
θ
)
+ βu(co(θ))
)
dF(θ) (30)
− µ∗
(ˆ
cy(θ)dF(θ)− F
(
K,
ˆ
n(θ)dF(θ)
))
− δµ∗
ˆ
co(θ)dF(θ)− δ−1µ∗K
+ ν∗
[
(1− λ)
ˆ
{u(cy(θ)) + βu(co(θ))} dF(θ)− Ŵ(K, G; W)
]
+ δν∗λ∑
Θ
u(co(θ))pi(θ)
where G is the labor distribution induced by F and n, subject to the incentive constraints,
and (ii) the multiplier-allocation pair satisfies the complementary slackness conditions:
0 = µ∗
[
F(K∗,
ˆ
n∗(θ)dF(θ))−
ˆ
cy∗(θ)dF(θ)−
ˆ
co∗(θ)dF(θ)− K∗
]
,
0 = ν∗
[
λ
ˆ
u(co∗(θ)dF(θ) + (1− λ)
ˆ
[u(cy∗(θ) + βu(co∗(θ)]dF(θ)− Ŵ(K∗, G∗; W)
]
with both multipliers and net constraint terms non-negative. Since in the benchmark
case with full depreciation, Proposition 7 applies, W = 0 and the function Ŵ(·; 0) in the
preceding optimization is easily recovered.
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